Abstract-The key rate of the B92 quantum key distribution protocol had not been reported before this research when the number of qubits is finite. We compute it by using the security analysis framework proposed by Scarani and Renner in 2008.
I. Introduction
The B92 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [2] has remained less popular than the famous BB84 protocol [1] , while both protocols provide the unconditional security. One plausible reason for the unpopularity is that the B92 is weaker to the channel noise than the BB84. Specifically, the BB84 with the standard one-way information reconciliation can generate secure key over the depolarizing channel at depolarizing rate 16.5%, while the previous security analyses of the B92 cannot guarantee the secure key generation at depolarizing rate 3.5% [13] , 3.7% [4] or 4.2% [10] . By using the security analysis framework introduced by Renner in 2005 [9] , we improved the maximal tolerable depolarizing rate to 6.5% [7] .
All of the above analyses [4] , [7] , [10] , [13] assumed the infinite number of qubits in the protocol, and derived the asymptotic key rates. On the other hand, in practice the number of qubits used in a protocol is always finite. However, before this research, the key rates with finite qubits in the B92 protocol had not been reported, as far as the authors know. In this paper, we report the key rates with finite qubits, based on the analytic framework introduced by Scarani and Renner [12] and our previous researches [7] , [11] . We stress that the assumption in our paper is the same as [12] , and in particular we assume the collective attack instead of the coherent attack.
II. New Security Analysis of the B92 Protocol with Finite Qubits
In this section, we present a new formula for the key rate of the B92 protocol with finite qubits, based on previous researches [7] , [11] , [12] . The following description has some overlap with our previous research improving the asymptotic key rate of the B92 [7] . Firstly, we fix notations. Let {|0 , |1 } be some fixed orthonormal basis of a qubit. In the B92 protocol [2] , Alice sends the quantum state
for j = 0, 1, where β = √ 1 − α 2 , and 0 < α < 1/ √ 2. For convenience of presentation, we also define
We can see that {|ϕ j , |φ j } forms an orthonormal basis of a qubit.
On the other hand, we can express a qubit channel as follows. Define the three Pauli matrices σ x , σ y , and σ z as usual. Then a qubit density matrix ρ can be expressed as [8] 
where
Define
As in [13] , we also define the four POVM
In [13] , the measurement outcomes corresponding to F¯0 and F¯1 was not distinguished. We distinguish them for better channel estimation. After passing the quantum channel E B from Alice to Bob, |Ψ Ψ| becomes
In a quantum key distribution protocol, the state change E B is caused by Eve's cloning of the transmitted qubits to her quantum memory. The content of Eve's quantum memory is mathematically described by the purification |Φ 1,ABE of ρ 1,AB . Let
In addition to Eve's quantum memory, she also knows the content of public communication over the classical public channel between Alice and Bob. For each transmitted qubit from Alice to Bob, the public communication consists of 1-bit information indicating whether Bob excludes his received qubit for generating the final secret key or not. We also have to take it into account. We shall represent the public communication by a classical random variable P that becomes 1 if Bob excludes his qubit and 0 otherwise. So, P = 0 when Bob's measurement outcome is F 0 or F 1 , and P = 1 when Bob's measurement outcome is F¯0 or F¯1.
On the other hand, in the B92 protocol, Bob performs the measurement specified by Eqs. (4)- (7). Alice and Bob use their qubit for generation of the final secret key only if its measurement outcome is F 0 or F 1 . Otherwise it is excluded from the key generation. This is mathematically equivalent to set Alice's bit to 0 if the measurement outcomes is F¯0 or F¯1. Therefore, from Eve's perspective on Alice's classical bit, the joint state between Alice and Bob after the selection by measurement outcomes is equivalent to
Observe that the state change from ρ 1,ABE to ρ 2,ABEP is a tracepreserving completely positive map.
In order to calculate the key rate, we need to consider Eve's ambiguity on Alice's classical bit [10] , [9] defined as follows. Let
Eve's ambiguity on Alice's classical bit S (X|EP) is defined as
where ρ 2,EP = Tr A [ρ 2,XEP ], and S (·) denotes the von Neumann entropy. In order to calculate the amount of public communication required for information reconciliation, we define the joint random variables (X ′ , Y ′ ) as
under the condition that the measurement outcome is either F 0 or F 1 . Observe the difference between X and X ′ . X ′ is not defined but X is defined to be 0 when Bob's measurement outcome is either F¯0 or F¯1.
We shall show the key rate per single transmitted qubit that is neither announced for the channel estimation nor excluded due to the measurement outcome being F¯0 or F¯1. Note that Eq. (9) is Eve's ambiguity per a qubit that is not announced for the channel estimation but can be discarded. The probability of the measurement outcome being F 0 or F 1 is
So we can see that Eve's ambiguity per single transmitted qubit that is neither announced for the channel estimation nor discarded is
.
By [10] , [9] the asymptotic key rate is
The above analysis is almost the same as our previous one [7] for the asymptotic key rate assuming the infinite number of qubits. Note that the above formula (11) assumes that Alice and Bob know the channel between them. In the BB92 protocol, we cannot estimate all the parameters of the channel, even if we assume infinitely many qubits in the protocol. We can only estimate part of them. In addition to that, because the number of qubits in the protocol is finite, there must be statistical errors.
To handle the finiteness of qubits, Scarani and Renner [12] used the interval estimation of channel parameters (R and t of (3) in our study). In contrast to the more popular point estimation, by using statistical samples, interval estimation gives a set of parameters that contains true parameters with high probability 1 − ǫ PE . By using the results in [12] , the key rate of the B92 protocol can be computed as
where Γ(ǫ PE ) is a confidence region given by an interval estimation procedure with the confidence level ≥ 1 − ǫ PE , ∆ is as defined in [12, Eq. (5)], and n is the number of the qubits to which Alice and Bob apply the privacy amplification.
To compute the rate (12), there are two remaining tasks, namely (a) computation of Γ(ǫ PE ), and (b) computation of min (R, t)∈Γ(ǫ PE ) S (X|EP). Task (b) is performed by using the convex optimization method [3] as done in our previous researches [7] , [11] . For convex optimization, the confidence region Γ(ǫ PE ) must be a convex set that can be easily handled by a mathematical software, like Mathematica. In [11] , such a convex confidence region was introduced for the BB84 protocol by using the KL divergence. We shall define Γ(ǫ PE ) also by using the KL divergence.
In the conventional researches [4] , [7] , [10] , [13] , their channel estimation procedures classified Bob's measurement outcomes into three categories, namely, F 0 , F 1 and the inconclusive (F¯0 or F¯1) . In this research, we propose to distinguish F¯0 and F¯1 for better estimation accuracy. On the other hand, the conventional estimation procedures did not distinguish which |ϕ 0 or |ϕ 1 produced Bob's measurement outcome. We also propose to distinguish Alice's transmitted qubits |ϕ 0 and |ϕ 1 in channel estimation.
By the above consideration, the proposed channel estimation procedure has at least 8 kinds of outcomes. On the other hand, the treatment of Bob's outcome F 0 , F 1 , F¯0 and F¯1 is asymmetric, because all of F¯0 and F¯1 are disclosed to Alice and are used for channel estimation, while parts of F 0 and F 1 are kept secret for the secret key generation. Because of this asymmetry, the sum of 8 POVM operators corresponding the above 8 outcomes does not become the 4 × 4 identity matrix I 4×4 . To make the sum equal to I 4×4 , we include the outcome meaning the qubit kept secret for secret key generation. By r pub (0 < r pub < 1) we denote the conditional probability for a qubit being disclosed for channel estimation, and the qubit is kept secret for secret key generation with a probability r pub . We define the following 8 POVM operators:
The last operator E 8 corresponds to the imaginary measurement outcome expressing the non-disclosure of a qubit. By this preparation of notations, we can describe the proposed confidence region of the channel parameters. Let D(P Q) denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence, λ(ρ 1,AB ) the theoretical probability distribution of the 9 outcomes defined as
and λ m the empirical distribution (i.e. relative frequencies) of the 9 outcomes, where m is the total number of qubits transmitted including both disclosed and non-disclosed qubits.
Observe that Alice and Bob can compute λ m in the protocol execution, and their task is to estimate the channel parameters (R, t). The set
is a confidence region of (R, t) with confidence level at least 1 − ǫ PE , by the well-known fact [5, Theorem 11.2.1] . It is also well-known that the set of (R, t) yielding a CP map is convex [6] , and D(· ·) is a convex function. Therefore the set (22) is a convex set. The above idea is similar to our previous research [11] on BB84. We have verified that the set (22) can be used as Γ(ǫ PE ) in (12) .
The minimization in (12) is just a convex optimization and can be done as follows. Observe first that S (X|EP) is a function of the channel parameters (3) of E B . By the almost same argument as [14, Remark 11] one sees that S (X|EP) is a convex function of the channel parameters (3). Moreover, we see that the minimum of S (X|EP) is attained when R xy = R yx = R yz = R zy = t y = 0 by the almost same argument as [14, Proposition 1] . Therefore, one can compute the minimization of S (X|EP) by the convex optimization [3] .
III. Numerical Result
We consider the depolarizing channel E q with depolarizing rate q. The definition of q follows [13] . For a qubit density matrix ρ, we have 
We stress that we do not restrict the range of minimization in (12) to the depolarizing or the Pauli channels. The minimization is carried out over the set of all the qubit channels in (22). The FindMinimum function in Mathematica 9.0 was used for the minimization. In Fig. 1 , the key rates for various depolarizing rates are plotted, and we compare key rates by our proposal and the asymptotic rates by Matsumoto [7] . We can observe that positive key rate is achieved at depolarizing rate 6.4% with 10 8 samples. The sample size refers to the total number m of transmitted qubits from Alice to Bob, including qubits giving measurement outcomes F¯0 and F¯0 and qubits becoming sifted key. In Fig. 2 , the key rates for various sample sizes are plotted with a fixed depolarizing rate 5%, and we also compare key rates by our proposal and the asymptotic rates by Matsumoto [7] . We can observe that our key rates converge to the asymptotic one. We only considered α = 0.39 and did not optimize the value of α in Eq. (1). The value α = 0.39 was also used in [7] . r pub was always set to 0.5 in our numerical computation.
IV. Conclusion
Before this research, the secure key rate of the B92 quantum key distribution protocol had not been reported. We have clarified it. Our analysis is based on the finite key rate formula proposed by Scarani and Renner [12] combined with our previous researches [7] , [11] . We have shown that one can have a positive key rate with 10 8 samples over a depolarizing channel with depolarizing rate 6.4%.
